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et al.: Recent Decisions

RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-State Action-Article of California
constitution prohibiting the state from denying right to any
person to decline to sell, lease or rent his real property to such
persons as he chooses would involve the state in private racial
discrimination to an unconstitutional degree. Reitman v. Mulkey
(Sup. Ct. 1967).
The petitioners were owners of an apartment building and
offered it for rent to the general public. The respondents desired
to rent, but petitioner refused on grounds that the respondents
were Negroes. The petitioners moved for summary judgment
based on article I, section 26 of the California constitution which
read:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof
shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right
of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent
any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease
or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his
absolute discretion, chooses.
Article I, section 26 of the California constitution was passed
as Proposition 14 in an initiative measure by voters of California. It, in effect, repealed prior legislation designed to combat discrimination.1 The trial court awarded summary judgment
and the respondents appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The California court reversed the decision finding article I,
section 26 to be violative of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. On appeal the Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. An article of the California constitution prohibiting
the state from denying the right to any person to decline to sell,
lease or rent his real property to such persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses would involve the state in private racial
discrimination to an unconstitutional degree. Reitman v. Mulkey, 87 S. Ct. 1627 (1967) (5-to-4).
To determine the validity of "Proposition 14," the Supreme
Court found it necessary to consider whether under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment there had been
1. Reitman v. Mulkey, 87 S. Ct. 1627, 1630 (1967), aff'g, 64 Cal. 2d 529,
413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966). For the historical background of Proposition 14, see Note, The Unconstitutionality of Proposition14: An Extension
of Prohibited"State Action," 19 STAN. L. REv. 232 (1966).
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unconstitutional state involvement in discrimination. 2 The mandate of the fourteenth amendment is not directed toward individuals; rather, it is "state action of a particular character that
is prohibited."3 As early as The Civil Rights Cases the Court
has held that the type of state action prohibited by the fourteenth amendment was that kind which "impairs the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . or which
4
denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws."1
State involvement may take many forms and it may not always
be readily apparent. In Nixon v. CondonP the Court held there
was state action when it was determined that the Executive
Committee of the Texas Democratic Party was acting as the
state's representative because the state legislature had given it
the authority it used in excluding Negroes from Democratic
primary voting.
Since the Nixon case the state action theory has encompassed
many forms of state participation which violate the equal protection clause. In Shelley v. Kraemer 6 the Court considered
whether the enforcement by a state court of a discriminatory
restrictive covenant was to be deemed an act of the state. In
finding unconstitutional state action the court said that "freedom
from discrimination by the states in the enjoyment of property
rights was among the basic objectives sought to be effectuated
7
by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment."
State action is found when the state is less involved than by
activities of its courts or legislature, and in some cases state
inaction may result in sufficient state involvement. Thus when
a state agency leased space for a private restaurant operated as
an integral part of a municipal public parking lot and did nothing when the restaurant excluded Negroes, there was state involvement. "By its inaction-the State, has not only made itself
a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its
power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination."
2. Reitman v. Mulkey, 87 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (1967). The fourteenth amendment states in part that a state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws." See also Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399, 402 (1964) ; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715,
724 (1961) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18, 23 (1948).
3. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
4. Id.
5. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
6. 334 U.S. 1 (1948); cf. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
8. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss5/13

2

SourT

et al.: Recent Decisions
CArtOEmA LAW REvm w

[Vol. 19

The state is not required to have a statute prohibiting racial
discrimination, and it may maintain a neutral position with
respect to private discrimination, 9 but once "the State [furnishes]
a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be aroused as to operate
against one group because of race..., 1 0 the state action becomes
unconstitutional.
The question raised by this and other cases is to what degree
must the state be involved before such involvement can be considered state action. It is agreed that a state must be more than
merely involved-the state must be significantly involved." As
in the Reitman case, however, the fourteenth amendment may be
violated in the situation in which a state can be charged only
with encouraging discrimination 1 2 because state encouragement
of discrimination is the equivalent of "significant involvement."' 8
In Reitman 'z. lulkey the Court did not attempt to formulate
a test for determining whether state action is involved but suggested that the courts must act on a "case-to-case basis."' 4 As
stated in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority "only by
sifting the facts and weighing the circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed
its true significance."' 0 The enactment is, therefore, to be viewed
by its "immediate objective" and "its ultimate effect," keeping
in mind its "historical context and the conditions existing prior
to its enactment.' 0
In Reitman the Court looked first to the immediate objective
of Proposition 14. By reviewing the history of the California
anti-discrimination laws which were repealed by Proposition 14,
it was determined that its purpose was to nullify these prior
laws and to establish a "purported constitutional right to privately discriminate on grounds which admittedly would be unavailable under the fourteenth amendment should state action be
involved."m.1

9. Reitman v. Mulkey, 87 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (1967).
10. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).
11. E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).

12. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 254 (1953).
13. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964) ; accord, Reitman v. Mul-

key, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 834, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 888-89 (1966).
14. 87 S. Ct. 1627, 1632-33 (1967).
15. 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).

16, Reitman v. Mulkey, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 1630 (1967). For application of these
criteria see Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); Robinson v. Florida,

378 U.S. 153 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); McCabe v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
17. Reitman v. Mulkey, 87 S. Ct. 1627, 1630 (1967).
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The Supreme Court in its discussion of Reitman v. Mulkey
has sought to explain and justify the California Supreme Court's
decision, rather than enlarge its scope. The California court had
held that the enactment did not provide solely for private discrimination.-' When the electorate exercises the legislative function, it becomes as much a state agency as any of its elected officials; thus, if discrimination results, it constitutes unconstitutional state involvement. 19
Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion indicated his
fears of the result of the majority opinion. He felt that "[b]y
focusing on 'encouragement' the Court... is forging a slippery
and unfortunate criterion by which to measure the constitutionality of a statute simply permissive in purpose and effect, and
inoffensive on its face." 20 He further expressed the opinion that
Proposition 14 presented a neutral position which gave to the
people a free choice which in itself is untouched by the fourteenth amendment. It is further suggested that the majority
so distorts the rule that the judiciary may now find unconstitutional state action in almost every area of private discrimination.

21

This decision may have more far-reaching effects than is readily apparent on its surface. It may be that legislatures and the
people will less readily accept enactments dealing with antidiscrimination in housing because of the fear that, once passed,
the state may not be able effectively to repeal the laws if later
desired. Whatever the effect, it is apparent that the distinction
between "state action" and "private action" is becoming more
22
blurred.
STANLEY

W.

APPLEBAUM

18. Reitman v. Mulkey, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 830, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881,

886-89 (1966).
19. Id., 413 P.2d at 834, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 890.

20. Reitman v. Mulkey, 87 S. Ct. 1627, 1640 (1967)

(dissenting opinion).

21. Id. at 1640-41.
22. For historical background to Proposition 14 and for a critical analysis of
the decision by the California Supreme Court see generally Note, The Unconstitutionality of Proposition 14: An Extension of Prohibited "State Action,"
19 STAN. L. Rv.232 (1966) ; Comment, Comments on Reitmann v. Mulkey, A
Recent Development in "State Action" Theory, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 1 (1966) ;
Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment and the State Action Doctrinej 24
WAsH. & LmE L. REv. 133 (1967).
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Habeas Corpus - Writ of habeas

corpus can be used to attack future state sentences which have
no present effect upon consideration of the prisoners for parole.
Rowe v. Peyton (4th Cir. 1967).
In 1963 Robert Rowe was convicted of rape in Staunton, Virginia, and a sentence of 30 years was imposed upon him. Three
days later in another Virginia town Rowe was convicted of the
felonious abduction with intent to defile the same female, and
a sentence of 20 years was imposed to run consecutively. Rowe
sought to attack his second conviction, the one for abduction, on
federal constitutional grounds.
In 1964 Clyde Thacher was committed to the Virginia State
Penitentiary to serve a number of sentences totalling approximately 60 years. He sought to attack three sentences scheduled
to begin in 1994 and to end in the year 2004.
Rowe's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was rejected by
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia without opinion.
Upon accepting Rowe's petition the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided that Thacher should not be
required to exhaust state remedies to present the identical question which the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had recently
decided against Rowe. On the combined appeal to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed. The writ of habeas
corpus is available to state prisoners seeking to attack, on constitutional grounds, state sentences to be served in the future
which have no present effect upon consideration of the prisoners
for parole. Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
The past refusals to permit habeas corpus to be used to attack
collaterally a prior judgment of conviction prematurely were
based in large part upon considerations of the fundamental purpose and scope of the writ. Historically, its vital purpose was
to secure the speedy and immediate release of those illegally
imprisoned.' Since the inquiry directed by the writ does not
seek a review of errors committed by a court having jurisdiction
over the offense and the person, logically the proceeding was
available only to challenge the right to present detention. These
traditional concepts were codified in the Federal Habeas Corpus
Statute which makes the writ available to attack collaterally a
1. For a comprehensive review of the doctrine of prematurity and the devel-

oping concept of habeas corpus and post conviction remedies, see Commonwealth
ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A2d 613 (1965).
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state court conviction if the prisoner is in custody in violation of
2
the Constitution of the United States.
In McNally v. Hill,3 a decision which has never been overruled, the United States Supreme Court held that a writ of
habeas corpus was unavailable to question a sentence to be served
in the future. To understand the apparent present conflict between this Supreme Court pronouncement and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rowe, a brief history of the habeas corpus
remedy as applied by the Fourth Circuit will be considered.
In Martin v. Virginia4 petitioner challenged the validity of
his future sentence showing that it adversely affected parole
considerations. The court recognized that the Supreme Court
itself was no longer adhering to the strict concept of "in custody."5 This principle had been equated with the idea of "restraint of liberty" on the individual. 6 Utilizing this generalized
language and so-called "progressively developing notions as to
the scope of the writ of habeas corpus," the court granted the
writ. The court observed that there was a reasonable ground for
thinking that were the Supreme Court faced with the issue
today, it might well reconsider McNally and hold that a denial
of eligibility for parole is a "restraint of liberty" no less substantial than the technical restraint of parole.
In Williams v. Peyton7 the petitioner was already eligible for
consideration for parole on a sentence which he did not question,
but his chances for parole were manifestly restricted by the fact
of other convictions and unserved sentences which were allegedly
invalid. Again the "restraint of liberty" argument was utilized
in holding for the petitioner. The Fourth Circuit then, carefully
in dictum, prepared for its next step, the Rowe decision:
[I]t is to the benefit of all that the validity of the 1956 convictions be determined now, so that, if appellant is to be
retried he may receive a trial in which the conflicting claims
of society and his claim to liberty may be properly adjudicated.8
Unlike the Williams and Martin cases, neither Robert Rowe
nor Clyde Thacher had any procedural restraints upon their
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964).
3. 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
4. 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).

5. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
6. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

7. 372 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967).
8. Id. at 221.
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liberty by a refusal to allow their challenge of future sentences.
The court, however, employed a combination of logic, necessity
and the practical considerations of modern jurisprudence in
granting to them habeas corpus hearings. If the petitioners were
compelled to wait the many years until they commenced service
of the challenged sentences, all responsible persons who participated in the trial might have died. Through this delay the
petitioners might lose the only means by which to substantiate
their claims. The state, moreover, stood to lose from this delay.
The greater the lapse of time, the more unlikely it would become
that the state could reprosecute if retrials were held to be
necessary. The court concluded that upon the principles of
fundamental fairness and due process of law, the petitioners had
the right to challenge their future sentences now, and that habeas
corpus had developed into the correct remedy.9
In the absence of state statutes which provide a post conviction procedure, many courts have found it necessary to afford
prisoners some type of adequate remedy. Although other remedies such as coram nobis, motion to vacate, and declaratory
judgment have been employed, the present case concluded that
habeas corpus is the means of obtaining an evidentiary hearing
and determination of any claimed violation of fundamental
rights. This new application of the habeas corpus in Rowe and
other cases raises a question as to whether the traditional function of the habeas corpus has been altered so that it can be used
in other areas as a post conviction remedy.
In the near future the Fourth Circuit will be confronted with
yet another attempt to enlarge the scope of application of the
habeas corpus remedy. It involves the question of whether a man
presently serving a sentence in one state can challenge a prior
conviction from another state which has resulted in a detainer
being filed against his record. 10 Similar to the Rowe situation)
the detainer does not affect the length of the present sentence
and may not presently affect parole considerations. The effect
of detainers varies among states, but it usually denies the inmate
certain privileges within the penitentiary itself. A federal circuit court case has indicated that the habeas corpus remedy can
be used to attack prior convictions "to the extent that any State
9. Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
10. Williams v. North Carolina, No. 11,770 (4th Cir., filed Sept.22, 1967,);

Matthews v. Womble, No. 11,487 (4th Cir., filed June 12, 1967); Word v.
North Carolina, No. 10,765 (4th Cir., filed July 13, 1966).
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makes its pena4 sanctions depend in part on the fact of prior con11
victions elsewhere ...
Whether courts will consider the denial of privileges within
the prison system to be a penal sanction under this formulation
must be left to future decisions. The more interesting and pertinent consideration is: Whether the Rowe decision can be used
as a basis to allow the inmate to contest another jurisdiction's
prior sentence which, as in the Rowe situation, does not have a
present effect on his confinement? Following the logic of the
Rowe decision-that if a prisoner is trapped by his lack of a
present hearing into "forfeiting" his claim that he was convicted
in violation of the constitution, he has been denied due process
of law-a remedy must be made available. Cases which have
involved somewhat analogous situations have indicated this further extension of the scope of the habeas corpus remedy. 12
Courts today increasingly allow access to their forums to present basic claims of conviction without due process. Rowe has
recognized the availability of the habeas corpus remedy to test
the validity of future state sentences which have no effect upon
present detention under a state conviction. The further extentions of the habeas corpus remedy briefly examined could be
temporarily denied on such grounds as jurisdiction, availability
of other remedies, and even prematurity of the action. The
Supreme Court itself could strike down this entire development
of the habeas corpus remedy if it were to uphold its original
pronouncement in MclVally. It is urged, however, that consonant
with the developing trends in modern jurisprudence, a post conviction remedy should be available to the Rowes and the Thachers. The groundwork has been laid with the application of the
habeas corpus remedy. To reverse this trend would necessitate
the search for a satisfactory alternative at the present expense of
denying many individuals due process of law under the United
States Constitution.
JomN H. Li Pmxn, Jn.
11. United States ex rel. Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349, 355 (2d Cir. 1957)
(emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., Slavik v. Miller, 89 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 184 F.2d
575--(3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 955 (1951). Petitioner had detainer

lodged whereby he would be delivered to the custody of the immigration
authorities at the time sentence was fulfilled in the state institution. Since the
petitioner was in the technical custody of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization, habeas corpus action was found to be a proper proceeding to
test the legality'of the deportation. But cf. United States v. Dumeur, 214 F.
Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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EVIDENCE-Collateral Source Rule; Covenant Not to Sue Cotortfeasor; Workmen's Compensation; Liability Insurance Evidence of collateral benefits received by plaintiff from employer, evidence of settlement with co-tortfeasor through covenant not to sue, evidence of workmen's compensation benefits,
held inadmissible; evidence of liability insurance, when necessary
to controvert written statement prepared by insurance adjuster,
held admissible. Powers v. Temple (S.C. 1967).
The plaintiff brought suit under the guest statute' to recover
damages sustained by her when the defendant's automobile, in
which she was riding, collided with another vehicle. At trial it
was proved that the plaintiff had received substantial salary
payments from her employer during the period of disability, as
well as $6,500 for a covenant not to sue the driver of the other
vehicle.
Evidence that the consideration paid for the covenant not to
sue had actually been remitted to the workmen's compensation
carrier2 was held inadmissible. The trial court reasoned that
were this evidence not excluded, the jury would be informed, in
violation of section 72-127 of the South Carolina Code,3 that at
least $6,500 in workmen's compensation benefits had been paid
to the plaintiff. That the plaintiff had received benefits in some
amount, however, was undoubtedly brought to the attention of
the jury because of a recital on the back of the complaint that
the action had been brought with consent of the workmen's

compensation insurer pursuant to section 72-124 of the South
Carolina Code.
Upon cross-examination the defendant made use of a written
statement signed by the plaintiff which appeared to contradict
her testimony. On re-direct examination the plaintiff was not
allowed to show that the statement had been prepared by a representative of the defendant's insurance company under the
universally established rule that it is prejudicial to inform the
jury that the defendant is insured.
A verdict was returned for the defendant and judgment entered. On appeal the plaintiff argued that admission of evidence
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
2. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-124, 72-422, 72-125 (1962).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-127 (1962) provides:
The amount of compensation paid by the employer or the amount of compensation to which the injured employee or his dependents are entitled
shall not be admissible as evidence in any action brought to recover
damages.
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concerning her receipt of collateral benefits from her employer,
as well as receipt of workmen's compensation benefits and consideration for the covenant not to sue, without further explanation that the consideration for the covenant had been remitted
to the compensation carrier, gave the jury a false impression
that she had been fully compensated prior to trial. Furthermore, it was argued that use of the written statement for impeachment purposes was prejudicial since the plaintiff was not
allowed to show that the statement had been prepared by a party
in interest. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, held, reversed and remanded. First, in a personal injury action evidence
of collateral benefits received by the injured party from an employer during disability is not admissible in mitigation of damages. Second, when there are no factual issues for determination
surrounding a covenant not to sue one tortfeasor, it is a matter
for the court alone, in an action against the co-tortfeasor, to
subtract the consideration received for the covenant from total
damages; and evidence of the covenant should be withheld from
the jury. Third, in a third party action brought by an employee
on behalf of a workmen's compensation carrier, testimony concerning the employee's receipt of workmen's compensation benefits should generally be avoided. Fourth, when a written statement is used by a defendant for purposes of impeachment, evidence that the statement was prepared by a representative of the
defendant's liability carrier is admissible. Powers v. Temple, 156
S.E.2d 759 (S.C. 1967).

Powers presents three related questions of evidence, all of
which turn on the more general issue of to what extent evidence
of prior benefits received by a plaintiff before trial will be withheld from the jury. A fourth issue involves an exception to the
well-established rule that evidence of liability insurance is ordinarily not admissible in a tort action.
A. Collateral Source Rule
Under the collateral source rule, compensation received by a
plaintiff prior to trial from some source apart from the defendant does not operate to reduce the defendant's obligation to compensate fully for damages proximately caused by his wrongful
conduct. The collateral source rule is generally applied when
wages have been gratuitously paid by an employer during the
period of disability. In this situation the defendant is still liable
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for loss of earnings and may not assert as a defense that, the
plaintiff will be compensated -twice for the same loss. Most
courts also hold that damages cannot be mitigated even though
the payments were not gratuitous, but resulted from a contrac4
tual or other legal obligation of the employer.
The reason most often advanced for the rule is that the wrongdoer should not receive what amounts to a windfall in taking
advantage of a third party's gratuity. It is better that the
plaintiff should be doubly compensated than that the defendant
should be exculpated from liability.5 To this extent, damages
under the collateral source rule take on a punitive character. In
the normal case of compensatory damages, the stress is upon
making the plaintiff whole, while in the collateral source situation, the stress is upon maling the defendant pay.6
But whatever may be the rationale behind the rule, whether
proper either in theory or policy, 7 the rule had been generally
established in South Carolina even before the instant case was
decided. In Jeffords a. Florence County8 the court held that
damages to the plaintiff's automobile were properly recoverable
even though these damages had been paid by the plaintiff's
insurance company. The court applied the typical rationale,
more directed toward the wrongdoing of the defendant than
toward compensation of the plaintiff: To hold otherwise would
have allowed the defendant to take advantage of an insurance
policy without paying the premiums. 9
A more extreme application of the rule occurs when the collateral benefits received by the plaintiff were gratitous instead
of paid for through insurance premiums. In Scott v. Southern
Railway10 the plaintiff brought suit for damages to his automobile and for the rental value of another automobile while the
damaged one was being repaired. The court allowed recovery
4. See gettrally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 516 (1966).
5. Id. at 522-23.
6. Note, Mitligating Effect on Damages of Social Welfare Programs, 63
HARV. L. REv. 330-31 (1949). See also Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages:

The CollateralSource Rule, 77

7. See genterally 2 F.

HARv.

L. REv. 741, 748-53 (1964).

& F. JAmES, T H LAW OF TORTS § 25.22
(1956) ; Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The CollateralSource Rule,
HARPER

77 HARV. L. REV. 741, 748-53 (1964).

8. 165 S.C. 15, 162 S.E. 574 (1932); accord, Joiner v. Fort, 226 S.C. 249,

84 S.E.2d 719 (1954).

9. Jeffords v. Florence County, 165 S.C. 15, 20, 162 S.E. 574, 576 (1932).

10. 231 S.C. 28, 97 S.E.2d 73 (1957).
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of a reasonable rental value even thb~ugh another automobile had
furnshed.grdt6s by a friend.
been
. Applying
the collateral source rule in the instant case, by
holding that evidence of gratuitous payments of the plaintiff's
salary was inadmissible in mitigation of damages, was but a logical extension of the holdings in the Jeffords and Scott cases
noted above. The rule embodied in these cases, as applied to loss
of earnings, is in accord with the rule as applied in virtually all
jurisdictions."
B. Covenant Not to Sue
The covenant not to sue developed as a means of avoiding the
strict common law rule that a release of one tortfeasor operates
as a release of all co-tortfeasors. The common law rule, which is
apparently in force in South Carolina, 12 is based upon the technical consideration that there exists only one cause of action
against joint tortfeasors even though they may be sued jointly
or severally. Since a release extinguishes this cause of action,
the co-tortfeasors, although not parties to the release, are no
longer liable, even though the consideration given for the release
was not in full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim.:'
The covenant not to sue, on the other hand, is a simple contract between the plaintiff and a tortfeasor in which the plaintiff merely promises, for consideration, not to bring suit against
that tortfeasor. Unlike a release, the covenant does not operate
to extinguish the cause of action; therefore, the co-tortfeasors
are not released. 1 4 The difference between the release and the
covenant is illustrated by the rule that while a release may be
plead as a complete defense against the releasor, technically, a
covenant not to sue, since it does not extinguish the cause of
action, cannot be set up as a defense by the covenantee, but must
be asserted by way of counterclaim against the covenantor for
breach of contract. 35 Most jurisdictions, however, disregard this
11. See generally Annot, 7 A.L.R.3d 516 (1966). The lower court in the
present case relied on Whiddon v. Malone, 220 Ala. 220, 124 So. 516 (1929),

in allofving evidence in mitigation of damages that the plaintiff's salary had been
paid during disability. Alabama is one of the few jurisdictions which does not
apply the collateral source rule in this situation.
12. American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co.,
70 F. Supp. 613 (W.D.S.C. 1947). See also Ayers v. Pastime Amusement Co.,

259 F. Supp. 358, 360 (D.S.C. 1966) ; McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co., 40 F.
Supp. 11, 13 (W.D.S.C. 1941).
13. See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R. 1057, 1060-72 (1927).
14. See generally Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 418-31 (1960).
15. Summers v. Bond-Chadwell Co., 24 Tenn. App. 357, 145 S.W.2d 7 (1939).
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technical requirement and allow the covenant to be plead by way
of answer to the covenantor's complaint in order to avoid circuity of action. 16
Some jurisdictions have also disregarded the technical consideration which requires that a release of one tortfeasor operate to
release the other tortfeasors. 17 Other jurisdictions, apparently
including South Carolina,' 8 reach virtually the same result by
construing a technical release, in which the releasor manifests
an intent not to release co-tortfeasors not parties to the release,
as a covenant not to sue. Thus a technical release in which the
releasor recites that he intends to reserve his rights against cotortfeasors may be construed as a covenant not to sue when it
does not appear that the releasor's claim has been fully satisfied.19
Although the covenant not to sue executed with one tortfeasor
does not extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action, it does serve
to reduce the damages recoverable from a co-tortfeasor to the
extent of the consideration received for the covenant. 20 This rule
is based on the theory that the plaintiff should have only one
satisfaction for his injury. Thus the emphasis here seems to
shift from requiring the defendant to pay, as under the collateral source rule, even though the plaintiff may be doubly
compensated, to compensating the plaintiff only once, whether
or not the defendant has to pay.
Once it is determined that the instrument executed by the
plaintiff is a covenant and not a release, the only other problem
which remains is whether the court or the jury should make the
deduction from total damages of the pro tanto satisfaction received by the plaintiff from the other tortfeasor. Following
North Carolina precedent, 2 1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
arrived at by far the best result in deciding that the court, not
the jury, should be required to make the deduction. Otherwise,
the jury would not only be given an unnecessary burden of computation, but might be tempted to make a somewhat less than
16. See generally 45 Am. Jue. Release § 3 (1943).
17. See generally Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 422-31 (1960).
18. McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11 (W.D.S.C. 1941);
accord, Ayers v. Pastime Amusement Co., 259 F. Supp. 358 (D.S.C. 1966).
19. McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11 (W.D.S.C. 1941).
20. Hanson v. Ulmer, 260 F. Supp. 97 (D.S.C 1966); McWhirter v Otis
Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11 (W.D.S.C. 1941).
21. Ramsey v. Camp, 254 N.C. 443, 119 S.E.2d 209 (1961).
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objective determination of total damages in view of the substantial compensation already received by the plaintiff.
Moreover, the jury's knowledge of the covenant places both
trial counsel in a somewhat precarious tactical position. The
plaintiff might be successful in convincing the jury that fair
play requires an amount equal to the consideration from the
covenant to be assessed against the defendant because both tortfeasors were equally guilty of negligence. On the other side, the
defendant may lead the jury to believe that the consideration
for the covenant represents full satisfaction of the plaintiff's
damages, for otherwise, the plaintiff would not have been willing
to settle with one tortfeasor, but would have sued both on their
joint obligation. 22 Under the Powers rule, upon stipulation by
the parties that the plaintiff has executed a covenant not to sue
one tortfeasor, the reduction of damages assessed against a cotortfeasor is handled entirely by the court, and the jury is
allowed to make a fair and objective determination of total damages without any chance of being misled as to the effect of the
plaintiff's settlement with the co-tortfeasor.
C. Workmens Compensation
When an injured employee accepts workmen's compensation
benefits from his employer or the employer's insurer, the employer or insurer is subrogated to the employee's cause of action
against a third party for damages to the extent of the benefits
paid.23 Any amount recovered against the third party by the
employer or insurer in excess of the benefits paid must be held
for the employee's benefit.24 Since suit may be brought by the
subrogee in the employee's name, 25 frequently, the employee
brings suit in his own name with consent of, and for the benefit
of, the subrogee to the extent of the amount paid.2 6 In such a
third party action the complaint often contains a recital that suit
is being brought with consent of the compensation carrier in
order to apprise the court of the subrogee's claim.
Although it is provided by statute that in a third party action
the amount of the benefits paid by the employer or insurance
22. See generally Annot., 94 A.L.R2d 352 (1964).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-124, 72-422 (1962).

24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-125 (1962).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-124, 72-422 (1962).
26. See, e.g., Fuller v. Southern Elec. Serv. Co., 200 S.C. 246, 20 S.E.2d 707
(1942); cf. Dawson v. Southern Ry., 196 S.C. 34, 11 S.E2d 453 (1940); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 72-123 (1962).
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carrier is inadmissible in evidence,17 there is no legislative declgration requiring that the existence of workmen's compensation,
as opposed to the amount paid, be withheld from the jury. Most
jurisdictions hold, however, that it is prejudicial error for the
defendant to reveal that the plaintiff is entitled to workmen's
compensation. 28 Since the defendant is liable for total damages
regardless, to be divided between the plaintiff and the insurer,
there is no reason why the jury should have extra knowledge
which might hamper a fair and objective determination of total
damages. As with the coisideration for the covenant not to sue,
only the trial judge need know of the prior benefits received by
the plaintiff so that the various claims to damages can be adjusted. 20 On these grounds the court in the principal case instructed that the existence of workmen's compensation should
not be brought to the attention of the jury upon remand unless
there arose some factual issue thereabout for determination.
The Powers decision, however, does not stand for the proposition that it is always reversible error to inject workmen's compensation into a third party action. Although the court decided
that under the circumstances the trial judge should have stricken
the recital concerning workmen's compensation from the back of
the complaint or should have allowed the plaintiff to show that
the workmen's compensation carrier actually received the $6,500
from the covenant not to sue, it did not hold that such failure
on the part of the trial judge, standing alone, constituted reversible error. Only as this evidence and evidence of the covenant
not to sue and collateral benefits combined to engender a false
impression of full recovery prior to trial did the necessity of a
new trial arise.
The question of whether or not testimony concerning the
plaintiff's right to workmen's compensation should be admissible is left primarily to the discretion of the trial judge.30 Accordingly, it may be proper for the defendant to cross-examine
the agents of the workmen's compensation carrier concerning its
subrogated claim to damages in order to reveal to the jury that
the testimony of the agents, as parties in interest, is biased.31 It
27. S.C. CODE

ANN.

§ 72-127 (1962).

28. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1154 (1961).
29. Accord, Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-operative v. Byrd, 264 F.2d 689, 69495 (4th Cir. 1959).
30. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1154, 1159-60 (1961).
31. Sprinkle v. Davis, 111 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1940). See generally Annot.,
128 A.L.R. 1110 (1940).
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has also been held that error in admitting evidence of workmen's
compensation may be rendered harmless through proper instruction of the jury.3 2
D. Liability Insurance

It is a universal rule, well established in South Carolina,3
that evidence which informs the jury that the defendant is insured against liability is ordinarily inadmissible because
[s]uch evidence or argument has a manifest and strong tendency to carry the jury away from the real issue and lead
them to regard carelessly the legal rights of the defendant
on the ground that some one else will have to pay the
34

verdict.

Like most rules of evidence, the insurance rule is not without
exceptions. It was recognized in South Carolina soon after the
rule was established that error in admitting evidence of liability
insurance might be harmless under the particular facts of the
case. Thus, when insurance was mentioned in a pre-trial colloquy
between the court and the plaintiff's counsel in the presence of
prospective jurors, the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance was upheld because curative instructions were given and
because the jury must have known that insurance was involved
anyway since the tort action was between a wife and husband
who were on amicable terms.35 Also a casual, ambiguous reference to insurance by a witness has been held insufficiently
prejudicial to be proper grounds for a new trial,30 and the mention of insurance has been held non-prejudicial when the defend32. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1154, 1159-60 (1961).
33. Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533 (1911).
34. Id. at 259, 75 S.E. at 541.
35. Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932). See also Matthews

v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 633-34, 124 S.E.2d 321, 328 (1962).

36. Gleaton v. Green, 156 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1946). There has been an in-

teresting array of cases before the South Carolina court in which the mention
or suggestion of liability insurance has been held non-prejudicial. E.g., Crocker

v. Weathers, 240 S.C. 412, 423, 126 S.E.2d 335, 340 (1962)

(Summation to

jury by plaintiff's counsel: "If you will write a verdict for the amount we ask

for in this complaint, I will collect at least $20,000") ; Powell v. Drake, 199

S.C. 212, 18 S.E.2d 745 (1942) (Plaintiff's counsel argued to jury that case
must not be very important to the defendant-employer since employer not present); Cummings v. Tweed, 195 S.C. 173, 10 S.E.2d 322 (1940) (Insurance
adjuster referred to as "Mr. X"); Jackson v. Enola Ginning Co., 139 S.C.
513, 138 S.E. 289 (1927) (Summation to jury by plaintiff's counsel: "If you

should cut off one of my hands I would get pay for it; the insurance company
would pay me, because I carry accident insurance").
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ant was allowed to prove that it carried no insurance and the
jury was so instructed.

3

7

A more clearly defined exception to the general rule exists
when the defendant is required by law to have liability coverage.
In such a case the insurance company may be joined as defendant ;38 thus, any attempt to withhold from the jury evidence in
dictating that the obligations of an insurance company are involved would be impracticable, if not impossible.3 9
A third category of exceptions to the general rule comes into
play when evidence of insurance is material to an issue in the
case. In these circumstances the purpose of admitting evidence
of insurance is to protect the plaintiff's right to elicit testimony
material to the establishment of his cause of action, 40 although
collaterally the jury might be tempted to render a verdict for a
greater amount, knowing that the insurance company will have
to pay. For example, evidence that a defendant-employer has
insured himself against liability for the tortious acts of his employees may be admissible as bearing on the question of agency
41
between the employer and employee.
The Powers exception to the general rule, disallowing an insurance company to take undue advantage of the protection
given it by the courts, is in accord with the position taken by
42
virtually all jurisdictions which have considered the question.
The plaintiff's interest in eliciting testimony in good faith,
which may collaterally inject insurance into the case, may outweigh the insurance company's interest in withholding such
evidence from the jury. The instant case is an example of such
a situation. If the insurance company chooses to use a written
statement of the plaintiff prepared by one of its agents, it is
only fair that it should also waive its rights to withhold the
fact of insurance coverage from testimony. Such a written statement may be decisive in discrediting the plaintiff's testimony
37. Wesley v. Holly Hill Lumber Co., 211 S.C. 40, 43 S.E.2d 619 (1947).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-702 (1962). Even before passage of this statute the
court allowed joinder of the insurance company when insurance was required
on the theory that the plaintiff had a beneficial interest in such a mandatory

insurance contract. Piper v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 157 S.C. 106, 154

S.E. 106 (1930), as clarified in Berm v. Camel City Coach Co., 162 S.C. 44,
160 S.E. 135 (1931).
39. Dobson v. American Indem. Co., 227 S.C. 307, 87 S.E2d 869 (1955);
Scott v. Wells, 214 S.C. 511, 53 S.E.2d 400 (1949); Bryant v. Blue Byrd Cab
Co., 202 S.C. 456, 25 S.E.2d 489 (1943).
40. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 775-79 (1949).
41. Id. at 776-77.
42. Id. at 782-83.
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and should be given its proper weight in view of the biased position occupied by the statement-taker. The only means of revealing the bias of the statement-taker is to reveal that the defendant
is insured. Of course, the insurance company can always avoid
revealing its identity to the jury by never making use of such a
statement if it fears that the jury's knowledge of insurance will
be more harmful than the statement is beneficial.
ROBERT M. EART
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INSURANCE-"Other Insurance" Provision-Escape clause in
garage liability policy was given effect over conflicting excess
clause in automobile liability policy-Allstate Insurance Gorpany v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Company, 269 N.C. 311, 152
S.E.2d 436 (1967).
Allstate Insurance Company. issued an automobile liability insurance policy to Ray W. Widenhouse with a policy limit of
$10,000. Shelby Mutual Insurance Company issued a garage
liability policy to Concord Motors, Inc., with a policy limit of
$5,000. While Mrs. Widenhouse was test driving an automobile
owned by Concord Motors with a view to buying it, she struck
and injured David Elroy Clontz, a minor.
Included in the definition of persons insured under Shelby
Mutual's policy is:
(b) any other person, but only if no other valid and collectible automobile liability insurance, either primary or
excess, with limits of liability at least equal to the minimum
limits specified by the Financial Responsibility Law of the
state in which the automobile is principally garaged is
available to such person. .

.

. (Emphasis added.)

The definition of "named insured" in the Allstate policy included the spouse if a resident of the same household. The
policy provided that with respect to a non-owned automobile the
named insured was insured if the use thereof was with the actual
permission of the owner. It also stated: "[T]he insurance with
respect to a temporary substitute automobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance."
It is apparent that Mrs. Widenhouse was an insured under the
Allstate policy since she came within the definition of "named
insured" in that she was the spouse of Ray G. Widenhouse and
a resident of his household, and she was insured with respect to
the non-owned automobile since she was driving it with the
actual consent of the owner. She was also apparently an insured
under the Shelby Mutual policy which included in its definition
of insureds any persons using the automobile with the permission of the named insureds and within the scope of such permission. In light of this apparent double coverage, Allstate brought
this suit for a declaratory judgment to determine the nature,
extent and priority of coverage provided by its own and Shelby
Mutual's policies. Jury trial was wavied, and the superior court
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found that both the Allstate and Shelby-Mutual policies afforded
primary coverage to the driver, Mrs. Widenhouse, and that within
the respective policy limits the loss should be prorated between
the two companies with both being obligated to defend Mrs.
Widenhouse in any suit brought by the injured boy. Both Allstate and Shelby Mutual appealed this decision and the North
Carolina Supreme Court held, reversed. When the driver of an
automobile involved in a collision was covered by an automobile
liability insurance policy and the automobile was covered by a
garage liability insurance policy, the garage liability policy did
not cover the accident in view of a provision therein that the
user of the named automobile would be covered only if no other
valid and collectible automobile liability insurance, either primary or excess, was available to the user.
The court first had to deal with Allstate's contention that its
policy provided no coverage at all due to the policy provision
denying coverage to a non-owned automobile while used in the
automobile business by the insured. Allstate argued that since
Mrs. Widenhouse was driving the automobile to determine
whether or not she would purchase it, it was being used in the
automobile business at the time of the accident. The court, in
holding that the automobile was not being used in the automobile
business, reaffirmed the earlier North Carolina case of Jamestown Mutual Insurance Company v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company' wherein it had said: "It would be a strained
construction of the phrase 'used in the automobile business' to
apply it to a prospective purchaser of a vehicle who is 'trying it
out' to see if he likes it." 2 This holding meant that the Allstate
policy did afford some coverage, and brought up the question of
whether its liability was affected by the existence of the Shelby
Mutual policy.
The "other insurance" dilemma is a major source of confusion
and conflict in the courts and the insurance industry today. The
problem stems from provisions contained in most insurance
policies which provide that if there is "other valid and collectible insurance," the particular company's coverage will, depending on the policy involved, do one of three things: First, assume
a pro rata share of the damages (pro rata clause); second, be
excess insurance over the limits of the other policy's coverage
1. 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410 (1966).
2. Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 440,

146 S.E.2d 410, 417 (1966).
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(excess clause); third, be noneffective (escape clause).3 When
the applicable portions of the two conflicting clauses are identical, that is, pro rata versus pro rata, excess versus excess, or
escape versus escape, the cases almost uniformly hold that the
two insurers must prorate the liability.4 The courts have been
unable, however, to agree on a solution when the conflicting
clauses are not identical, presenting a conflict between pro rata
and excess, pro rata and escape, or excess and escape.
Some courts have settled the problem by fixing primary liability on the policy issued first in point of time. 5 This formula
has been rejected by other courts on the theory that, regardless
of which was written first, both were in effect when the accident occurred and therefore liability attached to each at the
same time.6 Several courts have placed the primary liability on
the insurer of the tortfeasor.7 This is contrary to the intent of
the insurers who intended to cover the tortfeasor whether he was
a named insured in their respective policies or an additional
8
insured under the respective policies' omnibus clauses. Still
another view is to make a distinction between primary and secondary coverage and to place the liability on the primary insurer.' The fault with this lies in the uncertainty involved with
determining which insurer is primary and which is secondary
and also the inability to cover every situation. 10 At the present
time, however, there appear to be two major opposing theories
on the solution of such conflicts. The majority view is expressed
by Zurich GeneraZ Accident & Liability Insurance Company v.
'lamor" and the line of cases which follow it. In Zurich the
conflict was between an excess and an escape clause. The court
held that the excess insurance provided by one policy was not
such "other insurance" as was required to bring into effect the
escape clause of the other policy. As a result the policy with the
3. Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 518 INs. L.J. 151 (1966).
4. Id. at 152.
5. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 F.2d

653 (6th Cir. 1940).
6. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v.Continental Gas. Co., 28 NJ. 554, 147 A.2d
529 (1959).

7. American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mut. Indem. Co., 161 F.2d 62
(3d Cir. 1947); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 51 Ohio App.

323, 200 N.E. 849 (1935).

8. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 NJ. 554, 147 A2d

529 (1959).

9. Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 518 INs. LJ.151, 154 (1966).
10. Id.
11. 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941).
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escape clause was liable to the extent of its limits, while the
policy with the excess clause was liable only for any excess provided over the other policy. The court said, "A decision must
rest upon a construction of the language employed by the respective insurers." 12
The minority view is expressed in those cases which follow
Oregon Automobile Insurance Company v. United States Fidelity & Gaaranty C'ompany,18 in which the conflict was between
a pro rata clause and an excess clause. As opposed to construction of the policies, this view states that "other insurance"
clauses are "indistinguishable in meaning and intent" and,
therefore, "one cannot rationally choose between them."' 4 For
this reason, proration is the solution to the conflict.
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Shelby Mutual Insurance
Company'5 the court considered the Oregon Automobile Insurance Company case and, although stating that it neither approved nor disapproved of the principles expressed therein, it
noted that the "other insurance" provisions of the two policies
before it were not "like" provisions. The court then moved on
to a consideration of the Zurich case and emphasized the language therein requiring a construction of the terms of both
policies.
The only cases with conflicting "other insurance" clauses substantially similar to those in the instant case are the Florida
case of Continental Casualty Company v. Weekes' 1 and several Louisiana cases. 17 The Louisiana cases followed the Oregon
view and held that the clauses were "like" provisions so the
policies must prorate. The Florida case, however, construed the
language of the policies and gave effect to the clause in Continental's policy which provided that it did not apply to "such a
loss as is covered on a primary, contributory, excess, or any other
basis by insurance in another insurance company." Since the
conflicting provision was an excess clause, substantial similarity
to the principal case can be seen.
12. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717, 720 (7th

Cir. 1941).
13. 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir.

1952).

14. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d
958, 960 (9th Cir. 1952).
15. 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967).

16. 74 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1954).
17. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So. 2d 750

(La. App. 1966), cert. denied, 249 La. 454, 187 So. 2d 439 (1966) ; Lincombe v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 1964).
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While these cases were of some help to the court, it reached its
decision mainly by a systematic and logical analysis of the conflict between the two policies. It stated that since the policy is
a contract between the parties it must be construed so as to carry
out their intent. In an "other insurance" conflict the second
policy may or may not be an event which sets in operation or
shuts off the liability of the first policy. Determining whether
it does or does not have such an effect requires two steps: First,
construe the policy to determine what event will set in operation
or shut off the company's liability; second, construe the other
contract or policy to see if it constitutes such an event.
Following this simple and logical method the court first looked
at the Shelby Mutual policy and determined that the existence
of another insurance policy, either primary or excess, was the
event which would shut off Shelby Mutual's liability. The next
step was to construe the Allstate policy, and this resulted in a
determination that it was such an event, since it had an excess
clause. As a result, Allstate is liable up to its policy limits and
must also defend Mrs. Widenhouse. Shelby Mutual, on the other
hand, has no liability at all.
The court was faced with one final point raised by Allstate;
i.e. whether the exclusionary clause in Shelby Mutual's policy
violated the North Carolina Financial Responsibility Law. It
held that the purpose of the law was not violated by the exclusionary clause. The Shelby Mutual policy guaranteed that there
would be valid and collectible insurance in effect up to the
amount required by the law, and so there was.
The case plainly reaches the correct result, and in so doing it
does much to clarify the "other insurance" problem. The emphasis is on giving effect to the intention of the parties rather
than on reaching artificial results. A simple, concise and yet
effective framework is set up for reaching the correct result in
every case, and it is to be hoped that it will be widely used.
G. GotDow HARiSOrN
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